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Darkened Counsel 
The Problem of Evil in Bergson’s Metaphysics of Integral 
Experience 
Anthony Paul Smith 
La Salle University 
Who is this who darkens counsel in words without 
knowledge?  
Job 38:2, trans. Robert Alter 
Metaphysics, then, is the science which claims to dispense 
with symbols. 
Henri Bergson, “An Introduction to Metaphysics” 
[Philosophy] must strive, by way of the concept, to 
transcend the concept. 
Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics 
 
Pessimism within Integral Metaphysics 
In his programmatic essay “An Introduction to Metaphysics,” Henri Bergson 
defines metaphysics as integral experience.1 Metaphysics understood as 
integral experience is distinguished by Bergson from a collection and 
cataloguing of discrete and immobile facts that can be instrumentalized and 
made use of in a simple practical sense. This understanding of metaphysics 
remains largely consistent throughout Bergson’s career as he investigates the 
nature of time, matter, memory, biological life, and the socio-political 
ontology of religion and morality. This metaphysics of integral experience 
has often been read as a kind of holism in simplistic, often unsympathetic 
summaries of Bergson’s philosophy. While these misreadings are largely 
absent from more careful studies of his work, in the school of interpretation 
owing much to Deleuze’s recuperation of Bergson we find a certain 
emphasis on the positive or productive nature of Bergson’s philosophy. For 
those working with Deleuze’s interpretation Bergson’s metaphysics is 
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thought alongside of Nietzsche’s philosophy of yes to life, in distinction to 
dialectical philosophies of lack (psychoanalysis), negation or substantive 
nothingness (Hegel), and primacy of the void or negation (Badiou, 
Bachelard). Even those commentaries unconcerned with Deleuzian themes 
and focused more on the philosophy of Bergson in itself—like the 
masterwork of Vladimir Jankelevitch’s 1931 (revised 1959) Henri Bergson—
arguably take optimism as a hermeneutic key for reading Bergson’s 
philosophy.2 
This essay proposes a counter-reading to this accepted narrative, 
acting as a darkened counsel. Not in the hopes of saying that Bergson was 
actually a philosopher of the negative or a pessimist in outlook. That would 
be foolish since those adroit readers of Bergson, whatever their particular 
personal philosophical commitments, are certainly not concocting this sense 
of optimism or integral holism from thin air. Yet, if Bergson’s philosophy is 
simply optimistic, or simply derives meaning from the wholeness of 
experience, then it risks a theodical structure which undercuts its ability to 
speak to contemporary social and political problems of suffering. These 
problems are not simply academic problems, but as suffered they are lived 
problems. A theodical structure is one that, at bottom, justifies the 
experience of suffering by way of a concept of the whole or some concept 
that functions to subsume everything within it.3 Suffering is subsumed and 
given meaning by placing it within a relation, often with a telos that 
redeems or sublimates the experience of suffering. This takes such a singular 
experience such as suffering and renders it merely relative to the part it 
plays within the system of everything.4 On my reading, Bergson’s 
philosophy contains a supplement of what we might call pessimism or 
negativity inherent in his metaphysics as integral experience. This 
supplement undermines the theodical structure that may be assumed to 
undercut Bergson’s philosophy when confronted with evil or suffering and 
is seen most clearly in his critique of the notion of “everything.”   
I surface that supplement by reading his metaphysics in dialogue with 
Theodor W. Adorno’s negative dialectics. This choice is perhaps surprising, 
but it is deliberate. In surfacing we bring to mind what lies unthought. In 
conjugating Bergson and Adorno I do not aim to defend (or not defend) 
Bergson from Adorno’s criticisms as elaborated most clearly and directly in 
Against Epistemology, nor do I intend to argue that Adorno ironically carries 
out a Bergsonism despite his criticisms.5 There may be value in such 
readings, but my conjugation of the two is meant rather to help us 
emphasize what Bergson’s metaphysics implies despite his downplaying or 
not making explicit an anti-theodicy at work in his philosophy. In fact, the 
strict separation between pessimism and optimism, between negativity and 
constructivism is a temptation that some readers of Bergson at times fall 
into, just as some readers of Adorno read all his work through a depressive 
form of pessimism. This is an instance of what Adorno refers to as “shallow 
A n t h o n y  P a u l  S m i t h  |  1 3 3  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 2 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.774 
depth” and, ironically with regard to Bergson, Adorno defines this shallow 
depth as thinking according to concepts of stoppage rather than thinking 
pessimism/construction within duration.6 Against such shallow depth, I put 
forward another description of integral experience as “suffering the wrong 
state of things.” The “wrong state of things” is a phrase from Adorno who 
writes, “Regarding the concrete utopian possibility, dialectics is the ontology 
of the wrong state of things. The right state of things would be free of it: 
neither a system nor a contradiction.”7 Adorno's sense of the right state of 
things here is purely negative and points towards something "ideal' 
foreclosed to narration. This is not altogether different from a kind of 
apophaticism that can only speak of the real identity of God through a 
negation of its claims that points towards the impossibility of representing 
such an identity through language. The reality always outstrips language.  
Interestingly this right state of things appears to be something 
Bergson’s mystic is able to foresee and prefigure, as he illustrates when he 
says of the “metaphysical anguish” produced by philosophical systems and 
the contradictions of intelligence in nature that “for a mystic these questions 
simply do not exist, they are optical illusions arising, in the inner world, 
from the structure of human intelligence.”8 Of course Bergson provides a 
different conception of this wrong state of things than one will find in 
Adorno’s negative dialectics, but what remains common is a refusal to 
subsume this wrongness into meaning, symbols, or even a simplistic 
redemptive end. We can further see the fittingness between Bergson’s 
integral metaphysics and Adorno’s negative dialectics when we consider the 
structure of The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. Adorno’s negative 
dialectic provides a philosophy for understanding the structures of the 
world (specifically freedom, nature, and spirit) and in particular the 
wrongness of that world, constituted as is it is by the break between concrete 
and ideal or (in more direct terms) injustice. Bergson’s Two Sources is mostly 
remembered for its final two chapters dealing as they do with an 
investigation of a positive dynamic religion and the possibilities such 
dynamic religion produce for future human society. But this ignores that 
half the text is devoted to tracing the defensive functions of morality and 
religion that are essentially compromises and capitulations to the failure of 
ideals to match up to the concrete. These two chapters on moral obligation 
and static religion are essentially tracing a negative dialectic within the élan 
vital before turning to thinking the form of life found in dynamic religion 
that beyond the concept of “life.” 
We will deepen this counter-reading of Bergson’s philosophy via 
Adorno in the following section in dialogue with the concept of durée before 
turning back to the task of surfacing the way suffering the wrong state of 
things manifests in Bergson’s socio-political ontology as traced in the 
experience and social institutions of religion and morality. This presents a 
challenge to my reading since Bergson’s ending cry to “fulfill” the “essential 
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function of the universe, which is a machine for the making of gods” 
suggests a redemptive end.9 However, I will attempt to show that any such 
simplistically optimistic reading of Bergson’s work does not attend to 
suffering and trauma in the same way that his own work does. As John Ó 
Maoilearca writes, “Leafing through the pages of The Two Sources on 
fabulation, one cannot miss its connection with trauma, especially the 
trauma of excess novelty: that is, novelty or difference beyond our 
foresight.”10 When the reader follows Bergson’s own method of refusing to 
play the game of theodicy, we are brought to see how the fundamental 
insight of Bergson’s metaphysics does not lapse into an unethical 
philosophy. Instead, Bergson’s metaphysics informs an ethic of how one 
might go on living despite intolerable conditions. I will attempt to show this 
by surfacing something akin to a negative dialectic between the mystical and 
the mechanical which unveils a profound awareness and attention to 
anguish made present in his own life through the evil manifest in the 
lingering effects of a disastrous war (World War I) and the horrific events 
beginning to form on the horizon during the writing of The Two Sources of 
Morality and Religion.  
 
The Critique of Theodicy in Adorno and Bergson  
Adorno’s philosophical project is explicitly pitched against the theodical 
form within philosophy. This is a surprising element of his work since so 
much of it is derived from the Hegelian construction of dialectics and the 
subsequent Marxist development. Hegel’s undeniably optimistic philosophy 
of progress takes dialectics as the engine that drives forward that progress. 
There is a sense in Hegel’s philosophy that all things work towards the 
good, that all the suffering produced by inter-European wars and the 
overwhelming violence unleashed outside Europe by European colonialism 
is justified from the start or comes to be redeemed by making that suffering 
relative to the objective good of a redeemed history. Undoubtedly Hegel’s 
written work is vast and useful to many, but nevertheless at his most 
thoughtless we see him deploy scenes of subjection and abject terror as 
simple plot points in an unfolding narrative of a claimed right state of 
things. All those sacrificed on the altar (Schlachtbank, literally “slaughter-
bench) of history are justified by the final end of freedom that humanity will 
achieve through the unfolding of a teleological history.11 They come to be 
simply negative moments that are brought into an overarching relational 
end that requires and thereby justifies those moments. He writes, “That 
world history is governed by an ultimate design, that it is a rational 
process—whose rationality is not that of a particular subject, but a divine 
and absolute reason—this is a proposition whose truth we must assume; its 
proof lies in the study of world history itself, which is the image and 
enactment of reason.”12 The very idea of freedom (a positive good) first 
requires the production of a subject cast as a slave by another subject that 
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casts himself as the master.13 Such a crime against humanity is justified by 
the positive good produced.  
Against this positive form of dialectics, we find Adorno’s 
development of what he calls a “negative dialectics.” He writes “Regarding 
the concrete utopian possibility, dialectics is the ontology of the wrong state 
of things.”14 Taking this in mind we might posit that positive dialectics is the 
ontology of the right state of things and it produces this theodical ontology 
by regarding subject and objects in relation to one another: the slave is in 
opposition to the master within the world of subjects and enlightened 
civilization is in opposition to nature within the world of objects. In 
developing the ontology of the wrong state of things negative dialectics 
takes time and gives attention to the inevitable suffering produced by 
placing subjects and objects in oppositional relation. Adorno here acts as the 
Prophet Job (the main figure of the first written book of the Hebrew Bible) 
does in the midst of his own suffering. Job’s friends counsel Job with 
thinking that obscures his suffering, that turns away from the real of his 
suffering and instead casts that suffering within frameworks that would 
justify it, that would produce a reason for suffering that is essentially 
meaningless in its subjective experience. When presented with the 
arguments of Job’s friends Adorno’s negative dialectics would counsel 
instead that we refuse the false image of redemption produced by 
subsuming that suffering into some already-decided system of progress and 
instead give voice to that suffering if the truth of it is to ever be thought. 
Adorno states this principle forcefully in Negative Dialectics writing, “The 
need to lend a voice to suffering is a condition of all truth. For suffering is 
objectivity that weighs upon the subject; its most subjective experience, its 
expression, is objectively conveyed.”15 We might say that if the history of 
philosophy has too often produced master readings of history and its own 
great texts, our small task here is to produce a slave reading. 
Let us unpack further Adorno’s criticism of the theodical form of 
philosophy in order to fully understand this challenge and how it might 
help produce a reading of the importance of suffering within Bergsonism. 
Adorno’s pessimism regarding philosophy is perhaps best known through 
his aphorism regarding the impossibility of poetry after Auschwitz. In his 
lectures on metaphysics he returns to the controversy and consternation this 
declaration occasioned. We will turn to the subtlety of that below, but it 
should be noted that he clearly evaluates the possibility of metaphysics by 
the same standard. I will quote his remarks here at length as they express a 
moral power and clarity worth noting and reminding ourselves of going 
forward in our attempt to read Bergson: 
Metaphysical experience, or the concept of metaphysics—both in 
one—present themselves quite differently today. And as a sign of 
this—the word symbol would be wretchedly inadequate, since we 
are concerned with the most symbolic thing of all—I will take 
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Auschwitz.  Through Auschwitz—and by that I mean not only 
Auschwitz but the world of torture which has continued to exist 
after Auschwitz and of which we are receiving the most horrifying 
reports from Vietnam—through all this the concept of metaphysics 
has changed to its innermost core. Those who continue to engage in 
old-style metaphysics, like everything merely earthly and human, 
there prove themselves inhuman. And the inhumanity which is 
necessarily present in such an attitude must also also infect the 
concept of a metaphysics which proceeds in this way. It is therefore 
impossible, I would say, to insist after Auschwitz on the presence 
of a positive meaning or purpose in being. […] To assert that 
existence or being has a positive meaning constituted within itself 
and oriented towards the divine principle (if one is to put it like 
that), would be, like all the principles of truth, beauty and goodness 
which philosophers have concocted, a pure mockery in face of the 
victims and infinitude of their torment.16 
The force of this argument is not “merely” rhetorical, though one should not 
simply dismiss arguments presented in such a rhetorical form as if a 
disinterested or apathetic exploration of Auschwitz would somehow 
produce something closer to the truth of Auschwitz. But Adorno’s 
argument, which here condenses aspects of Negative Dialectics, is a profound 
argument that posits the necessity of taking account of suffering within a 
metaphysics as part of the experience of the metaphysical structure of the 
world.   
Later in the same lecture Adorno makes explicit reference to Leibniz’s 
philosophy where arguably the first explicit philosophical theodicy is 
produced within European thought. There he points out that people often 
misrepresent Leibniz’s theodicy since it is not as optimistic as it appears in 
the dictum “the best of all possible worlds.” Instead it refers to the 
“optimum, the minimum optimum.”17 Yet even this limited optimism was 
shaken and ultimately destroyed for a reader of Leibniz like Voltaire after he 
witnessed the ultimately meaningless deaths caused by the Lisbon 
earthquake. Such an event can perhaps be accounted for within a 
metaphysics, seeing as it is a limited natural catastrophe and even within a 
philosophy that sees positivity in existence it can settle for that positivity 
being concentrated in human subjects. But, Adorno asks, what really is such 
a catastrophe when “compared to the natural catastrophe of society”?18 In 
other words, while the purpose of some metaphysics has been to engender a 
certain rationality that controls nature, what are we to do when “when 
socially produced evil has engendered something like a real hell?”19  
Theodicy fails in the face of an integral metaphysics. While we are 
stepping outside of Adorno’s preferred terminology and thinking here along 
with Bergson, we can call Adorno’s conception of a “natural catastrophe” 
univocal precisely because it includes the whole of nature. It includes those 
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aspects of nature that are non-human (the brutality we see in the animal 
world in the relationship between prey and predator, the meaningless of 
events like earthquakes, tornado, hurricanes, and the like, and even at a 
more cosmic scale the eventual heat death of the universe) as well as those 
aspects of nature that are human (society being produced within the natural 
world according to certain natural conditions and limits to society as well as 
the production of metaphysics itself). Taking seriously the notion (one might 
perhaps call it an intuition despite Adorno’s protests) that the production of 
metaphysics is itself a metaphysical production means that metaphysics 
(both the thought and its object) is itself affected by suffering.20  
Importantly, especially for the fittingness with Bergson’s own relative 
optimism (which he calls “empirical optimism”), Adorno’s rejection of 
theodicy as encapsulated in his negativity does not lapse into what he calls 
“false depth” or false profundity.21 In dialogue with afro-pessimism, a 
powerful articulation of the negative in critical theory regarding race (an 
articulation that is more powerful even than what I think exists even in 
Adorno’s philosophy), I have referred to this false profundity as anglo-
pessimism.22 Such a version of pessimism does not proceed from attention to 
suffering, but a certain kind of theodical narrative regarding suffering. 
Though rather than justifying this suffering through appeals to the divine 
principle within reason, as we saw with Hegel, suffering is justified through 
the appeal to truth after the death of God. “According to this way of 
thinking,” Adorno claims, “all thought that takes happiness seriously is 
deemed shallow, whereas thought is said to be deep if it treats denial and 
negativity as something positive gives it meaning.”23  
The rejection of theodicy is not driven by such cheap pessimism. It 
flows from the real anguish given in the attention to suffering itself. 
Adorno’s realist pessimism is mirrored in Bergson’s own rejection of 
theodicy. This occurs late in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, when 
Bergson admits that “attributing the place we do to man, and the 
significance we do to life, it may well appear optimistic.”24 But despite the 
implication some might mistakenly draw from his integral metaphysics, his 
vision of nature is not univocal. Rather, like we often find in Bergson, there 
are two senses or two meanings for nature that operate in his work.25 He 
himself references Spinoza’s distinction between natura naturata and natura 
naturans.26 But we might better understand the two meanings by taking the 
first to refer to a transcendent form of life that gives itself in a mental 
representation as static or fixed and the second as the experience of nature 
that is given through living life as a natural entity that is necessarily 
dynamic since it is by nature in duration. As part of nature we see suffering. 
Philosophy often does not give attention to such suffering for “our pain is 
indefinitely protracted and multiplied by brooding over it.”27 
Yet, the whole practice of metaphysics as integral experience is 
described by Bergson in his introduction to metaphysics as imbricated with 
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the experience of such pain. So it comes as no surprise that even though 
Bergson recognizes that new situations produce the possibility of adding “a 
few paragraphs” to Leibniz’s theodicy he has “not the slightest inclination to 
do so.”28 Instead he evokes the image of a mother who has lost her child and 
says that it is an “unwarrantable optimism to define evil a priori, even 
reduced to what it actually is, as a lesser good.”29 That is, to think evil, to 
produce a metaphysics of evil, one has to experience it just as one does with 
anything that might be understood within integral metaphysics. Even if 
there is a rational image of evil as a lesser good, the real of evil can only be 
attended to in the pain of integral metaphysics. This has a similar form to the 
Christian, specifically Catholic, doctrine of evil as a twisted good. For 
Christian theologians the argument is that it would contravene God’s 
omnibenevolence if evil is taken as radical or substantive. Radical evil would 
have a substantial being, whereas the view of evil as privation, as found in 
Catholic teaching, says that evil is dependent upon the good in the last 
instance for its very being.30 This is of course pure theodicy. Yet, if Bergson 
is to be consistent, then his own conception of evil here is not theodical. 
Instead, Bergson’s point might be seen to be more damning than radical evil. 
For at least with radical evil there might be something like a cosmic battle 
that ends evil once and for all (a future oriented theodicy), not unlike certain 
visions of the final stage of communism where the withering away of the 
State defeats capital’s impoverishing effects. Bergson’s point though is that 
even within the concept of good there is movement, there is constant 
change, there is the necessity that goodness may itself be evil, just as evil as 
the death of a child.  
Let us turn to his conception of durée now and see how something like 
this negative dialectic is at play there already. After we will turn back to The 
Two Sources of Morality and Religion where Bergson's final refusal of theodicy 
is found in his critique of the idea of “everything” that is implied in 
theological claims regarding God’s omnipotence, omniscience, and 
omnibenevolence. Instead of some kind of redemption within the 
"everything" we will see that Bergson's empirical optimism is based upon a 
joy in joy, without narrative.  
 
Conjugating Durée with Negative Dialectics 
At the heart of the concern that Bergson’s integral metaphysics is theodical is 
the recognition that in Bergson’s metaphysics suffering and evil are 
produced by the same unique or singular duration. Rather than durée 
justifying that suffering or evil it points to the way that durée may be 
fruitfully understood along the lines of Adorno’s notion of non-identity 
where there is a contradiction in the concept or thing, rather than between 
various concepts and things.31 Adorno’s notion of negative dialectics thus 
posits a similar undercutting of static unity as Bergson’s durée or integral 
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experience and places thought within the very movement of thought rather 
than seeing thought as standing outside and thus moving between 
moments.  
In order to come to see how duration may produce something akin to 
a “negative dialectic” (what we might call “negative duality” to be more 
idiomatic to Bergson’s own work) we must outline Bergson’s conception of 
duration itself. The recognition of duration is often said to be Bergson’s most 
fundamental insight.32 And certainly he gives testimony to this fact in a 
letter written on the 9th of May, 1908 to William James where he explains his 
parting of ways with the mechanistic philosophy of Herbert Spencer, “It was 
the analysis of the notion of time such as it appears in mechanics, or physics, 
which revolutionized all my ideas. I realized, to my great amazement, that 
scientific time has no duration […]. This was the starting point of a series of 
reflections which led me, step by step, to reject almost all that I had 
previously accepted, and to completely change my point of view.”33 But 
Bergson’s conception of duration is not given once and for all, it too takes 
time. There is a shift in thinking about duration from his first major work, 
Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, to that of 
Creative Evolution. This ultimately moves from the idea of duration as 
psychological time to an ontological understanding of duration. But 
following Henri Gouhier we may see this movement as ultimately 
continuous with itself in the same way that a musical score is given through 
duration. According to Gouhier the philosophy of Bergson can be 
considered a “spiritual realism” in the tradition of French spiritualists like 
Ravaisson and Lachelier.34 Gouhier writes, “Thus, in the moment where 
Bergson poses the problem of liberty, there is in his thought much more than 
in his book. The reader of Time and Free Will has the feeling of being initiated 
in a new philosophy of spirit: in fact, this one emerges from a philosophy of 
nature which preceded it and discretely frames it.”35 Gouhier holds that the 
philosophy of mind present in Time and Free Will is framed by the failure of 
Spencer’s philosophy of nature and not purely by an interest in 
psychology.36 Indeed Gouhier is quite forceful that Bergson’s thought is not 
at all a part of psychology, but that he comes to psychology by way of his 
philosophy of nature. He says, “The thesis of Time and Free Will represents 
an intermediary stage between a failed philosophy of nature, that of 
Spencer, and the true philosophy of nature, Creative Evolution.”37 This is 
perhaps what Adorno means when he says that Bergson resisted the 
imprisonment in the realm of pure domination, “the mere control control of 
what has not been comprehended […] in opposition to the endless pressure 
of the positive sciences and the reified world, and he did so with an 
abstractness and stubbornness equal to that pressure.”38 Duration may 
therefore be Bergson’s most fundamental insight but it is so because it 
interweaves philosophy of spirit in a philosophy of nature within an integral 
metaphysics of experience that both engages with the positive sciences (like 
physics, mathematics, and biology) and resists the spontaneous philosophy 
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of science that is at the same time a social and political philosophy. Bergson 
goes beyond his predecessors in that his is a philosophy of nature and spirit, 
at the same time without, as Ravaisson did, determining everything by way 
of spirit in an idealist manner. Gouhier says it thusly, “It is, if we dare to 
speak of it, spirit which gives the key to nature.”39 Philosophy of spirit, in 
this case understood via the concept of duration rather than history, opens 
up our understanding of nature rather than presenting metaphysics simply 
as a closed system.  
When Bergson first conceives of duration it is primarily in terms of the 
real subjective experience of time as opposed to objective scientific time. To 
understand this more clearly it is necessary to see that Bergson’s is a very 
idiosyncratic notion of what is subjective. Bergson writes, “We apply the 
term subjective to what seems to be completely and adequately known, and 
the term objective to what is known in such a way that a constantly 
increasing number of new impressions could be substituted for the idea 
which we actually have of it.”40 To know something completely and 
adequately is to know it qualitatively. Turning to our own experience of 
time, we see evidence of this in the experience of boredom or excitement. 
The duration of boredom has a different quality of passing than the duration 
of excitement. In philosophy and science we tend to ignore this experience of 
time in favor of the objective scientific time since the reduction of time to 
abstract space is heuristically helpful when attempting to solve 
mathematical problems (though calculating too takes time, even for 
sophisticated machines unencumbered with human subjectivity).  
But it cannot be denied that though this spatialization of time is 
heuristically helpful in certain situations, it remains a confusion of the 
quantitative or extensive with the qualitative or intensive. Bergson spends 
his first chapter of Time and Free Will differentiating the qualitative 
(intensive) from the quantitative (extensive). According to Bergson 
philosophers have tended, in their reflection upon reality, to think of things 
in terms of intensity, but there are different kinds of intensity; namely the 
intensity of a feeling and that of a sensation or an effort.41 Sensations 
properly so called, and Bergson means the inner or intensive sensation, are 
connected to their external cause, even though the intensity of these 
sensations cannot be defined by the magnitude of their cause.42 Indeed we 
see that they are connected because as consciousness manifests (for instance 
in the feeling of joy or hate) it appears to spread and develop into extensity 
(smile, shaking, clenching, etc.). Extensity and intensity must be connected 
in a fundamental way for Bergson says that if you eliminate all the organic 
disturbances (shaking, etc.) from anger you are only left with the idea and 
can not assign it any intensity.43 So, though many critics of Bergson hold that 
he rejects space or extensity in favor of a merely psychological, and thus not 
real, notion of time and intensity, we may respond that already in the first 
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chapter of his first major work Bergson connects the extensive and the 
intensive at the same time in reality.  
It is quite clear that the “organic disturbance” comes before the idea 
and even more so that the idea and the action form a whole intensive 
sensation:  
We […] maintain that these movements [organic disturbances] 
form part of the terror itself: by their means the terror becomes an 
emotion capable of passing through different degrees of intensity. 
[…] There are also high degrees of joy and sorrow, of desire, 
aversion and even shame, the height of which will be found to be 
nothing but the reflex movements begun by the organism and 
perceived by consciousness.44  
Bergson seems to be silently invoking an unconscious intuition prior to 
consciousness. A further quotation will serve to illustrate this: “Where 
emotion has free play, consciousness does not dwell on the details of the 
accompanying movements, but it does dwell upon them and is concentrated 
upon them when its object is to conceal them.”45 Emotion is here located in 
muscular contractions coordinated by an idea that remains unreflected 
upon, or unconscious, in this case the unconscious nature of acting. Only 
when the object of the organism is to conceal sweating, shaking, or any other 
set of organic disturbances, is the idea then reflected upon in consciousness.  
In consciousness we tend to think in terms of space rather than time. 
According to Bergson this spatialization is necessarily coextensive with the 
use of the intellect. He uses the example of number. Number is a synthesis of 
the one and the many, in that every number is one through unity, but this 
unity is a sum which covers a multiplicity of parts which can be considered 
separately.46 Bergson states that while we do indeed count moments of 
duration rather than points in space, we do so by means of points in space 
thereby abstracting or distancing the reality of duration: “We involuntarily 
fix at a point in space each of the moments which we count, and it is only on 
this condition that the abstract units come to form a sum. […] Every clear 
idea of number implies a visual image in space.”47 This is because we 
conceive of number as a discrete multiplicity that admits of being divisible 
to an unlimited extent and ipso facto as spatialized within homogenous 
space. But this is not the only way of thinking a multiplicity or unity. 
Bergson says,  
We must distinguish between the unity which we think of and the 
unity which we set up as an object after having thought of it. The 
unit is irreducible while we are thinking it and number is 
discontinuous while we are building it up: but, as soon as we 
consider number in its finished state, we objectify it, and it then 
appears to be divisible to an unlimited extent […]48 
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Clearly what is at stake here is the difference between two kinds of 
multiplicities. This problem is more fundamental than that of the one and 
the many if we are to dissolve false problems. For instance, the problem of 
freedom as traditionally conceived is a false problem arising from the 
confusion of these two kinds of multiplicities.49  
Prudently the question is asked if this difference between 
multiplicities is purely psychological or is it a real distinction? In the light of 
the whole of Bergson’s work it is clear that the two multiplicities are real. 
Yet, to understand this one has to relinquish the philosophical illusion that 
the subject is not real. As Deleuze claims, the radical thesis of Bergsonism is 
that “all consciousness is something.”50 From Matter and Memory onwards 
Bergson extends the notion of duration past mere psychology to an 
ontological thesis about reality itself.51 In Matter and Memory Bergson does 
not construct a strong dualism between matter and memory because, as 
John Ó Maoilearca says, “both belong to durée in terms of their substance.”52 
Importantly, if we take duration to act as the substance (though again one 
must understand this concept through that of non-identity) underlining both 
matter and memory, we must not confuse memory or matter with space or 
we risk losing both memory and matter to mere epiphenomenalism. 
There is space here for readers to confuse Bergson’s critical remarks 
about space with a criticism of matter itself. It is thus important to note that 
Bergson differentiates between extensity and the homogenous space of 
Newtonian physics. The inadequacy of Newtonian physics shares the errors 
of our perception more generally. In our perception of the world, or in a 
more precise sense, our surrounding and immediate environment we tend 
to think in terms of a discrete multiplicity such that each individual is in 
itself discontinuous. The real extensity of matter must be distinguished from 
the abstract form of homogenous space and the homogenous time 
coextensive with it. The abstract form is useful in terms of action, but leads 
to insurmountable difficulties when confusing them with real properties of 
things.53 What is real is duration, or the continuous process of forming a 
connected whole.54 This is, in part, the Bergsonian integral reality of 
duration; duration shows us that there is no clear cut distinction between a 
thing and its environment.55 At the same time we recognize that in reality 
there must also be distinct quantities in the ecosystem, but duration as a 
qualitative multiplicity subsumes quality and quantity by linking them 
together: “the humblest function of spirit [the qualitative] is to bind together 
the successive moments of the duration of [quantitative material] things […] 
we can conceive an infinite number of degrees between matter and fully 
developed spirit […] Each of these successive degrees […] corresponds to a 
higher tension of duration.”56  Separating quality and quantity from one 
another is an act of spatializing by the intellect, while thinking from 
duration allows us to see the integral nature or non-identity of the two.  
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We may add another baroque element towards understanding 
duration. If Gouhier is correct in saying Creative Evolution represents the true 
philosophy of nature it would be a deep error to skip over this text with 
relation to duration since the concept of duration requires we rethink the 
concept of nature. Clearly the concept of duration is not finished being 
thought by Bergson at the end of Matter and Memory as he opens up Creative 
Evolution with yet another description of duration: “Our duration is not 
merely one instant replacing another; if it were, there would never be 
anything but the present—no prolonging of the past into the actual, no 
evolution, no concrete duration. Duration is the continuous progress of the 
past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances.”57 To 
illustrate this Bergson employs what is now a rather famous example of 
sugar water. If one wants mix a glass of sugar and water one must wait until 
the sugar melts before they can have it.58 This waiting is not simply 
mathematical time because it coincides with impatience, “with a certain 
portion of my own duration, which I cannot protract or contract as I like. It 
is no longer something thought, it is something lived. It is no longer a 
relation, it is an absolute.”59 This is not to say that the glass, the sugar, the 
water, and myself are not related, but that relation itself is absolute and 
contracted into a whole. Importantly, to be the absolute, this whole cannot 
be the whole since it too is in duration. Indeed, Bergson will argue that the 
standard identity of the whole is false in The Two Sources of Morality and 
Religion. 
  
Mechanical and Mystical Suffering 
Bergson’s integral metaphysics it articulated in terms of the social and 
political content of metaphysics in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, to 
which we will now turn. As we begin to read that work I want to again 
bring to mind the way we have brought the work of Adorno in as a way to 
surface elements that are usually passed over in readings of Bergson. 
Foremost of all metaphysical questions, and Adorno insists that this is a 
metaphysical question, that is, “the question whether one can live after 
Auschwitz?”60 As we might be reminded by Sylvia Wynter, another major 
critic of the theodical form in philosophy, this question has actually existed 
for much longer than the horrors carried out at Auschwitz.61 How can one 
live after the institution of slavery, after European colonialism, is the 
question that must be responded to by any philosophy that hopes to give 
voice to truth and suffering. Such is the question, not simply because the 
horrors of slavery are absolutely overwhelming, like the horrors of 
Auschwitz. Unlike Auschwitz, the horrors of slavery constitute the 
conditions for existence today. As theorists like Wynter and others show, the 
framework or episteme we understand the world through emerges from this 
institution and as economic historians like Edward E. Baptist and others 
show our economic system only exists because of the wealth derived from 
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slavery.62 In Chapter 26 of Capital Karl Marx famously identifies such a 
transition from primitive accumulation to its rationalization of oppression in 
the capitalist system as akin to "original sin" that is passed to each 
subsequent generation.  
It would have been impossible for Bergson to address philosophy after 
Auschwitz since he died a victim of the everyday terror of the Nazi 
occupation of Paris. Sadly, there is also little evidence in Bergson’s writings 
of any real awareness of the horrors of slavery and colonialism before 
Auschwitz, though a subtle reading of The Two Sources of Morality and 
Religion would note the many places where colonial scenes are referenced 
and how the singular figure of slavery functions on its margins. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the question of how one can affirm life in the 
midst of trauma, anguish, and suffering is an important one. The object of 
his inquiry in this text is morality and religion. Bergson presents here, 
consistent with his general philosophical method, a duality at the heart of 
the identity of religion that centers upon the problem of suffering and the 
experience of evil within the world. Arguably, as I claimed in the preceding 
section, the identity of religion at play in The Two Sources of Morality and 
Religion is better understood through Adorno’s conception of non-identity. 
For religion in Bergson is split between static religion and dynamic religion, 
though produced by the same driving engine of life and both rightly 
conceptualized as religion. Religion provides a certain response to the 
question of how one can live in the midst of suffering and that Bergson 
attends to the gap or fracture within religion’s identity speaks to an aspect 
that is in fundamental agreement with Adorno’s own conception of how one 
can do metaphysics after Auschwitz.  
Bring to mind again Adorno’s famous declaration that after Auschwitz 
one could no longer write poetry. This is important because fundamental to 
Bergson’s understanding of static religion is fabulation (what his translators 
express with the English phrase “myth-making function,” which can lead to 
certain misunderstandings when reading Bergson after Adorno’s critique of 
myth). The more standard translation would be “storytelling” and we can 
begin to see already the connection such a practice has with the writing of 
poetry. Within the fundamentally reactive space of static religion in 
particular and the wrong state of things more generally, there is an 
antinomy between the prohibition against the creative act (be it writing 
poetry, storytelling, or the practice of religion regardless of its static or 
dynamic character) and the necessity of that same creative act in the 
declaration of the prohibition. In response to the consternation and derision 
his declaration occasioned, Adorno says that he could not have anticipated 
the reaction since it is the nature of philosophy to not mean things quite so 
literally. In a statement that resonates with Bergsonism he claims, 
“Philosophy always relates to tendencies and does not consist of statements 
of fact.”63 The gap between these tendencies is where philosophical 
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reflection is produced, according to Adorno, again resonating more with 
Bergsonism than with the post-Kantian tradition Adorno references in the 
midst of his lecture. But this leads him to the statement that, at least within 
the wrong state of things, it is both true that after Auschwitz one cannot 
write poetry and that after Auschwitz one must write poetry.64 It is subject 
to this same double injunction produced by life that we find in religion 
according to Bergson’s philosophical reflections. 
What defines the dominant mode of religion, static religion, is 
fundamentally reactive. Bergson says, “It is a defensive reaction of nature 
against what might be depressing for the individual, and dissolvent for society, in 
the exercise of intelligence.”65 At the heart of static religion and this defensive 
reaction of nature is fabulation. Fabulation is the most active aspect of this 
mode of religion, but it comes second in the order of functions and is 
subordinate to this defensive reaction of nature.66 The argument runs that 
life has endowed humanity with intelligence to such a degree that it can 
recognize its own death. This ability to rationalize can run counter to the 
impetus of life, which is to create more life, in that it can depress the human 
person. Life then develops fabulation as a second order function of 
intelligence that resists the excesses or damaging aspects of intelligence.67 
Such fabulation makes sense and provides meaning in the midst of events 
that intelligence would tell us are meaningless. Such fabuluation is not 
distinct to the realm of religion as even his example of a tile coming loose 
from a roof to fall and, by chance, nearly kill a passerby on the street is taken 
by the passerby as purposeful. Yet intelligence allows us to understand that 
such actions are not purposeful. All the factors that went into the tile coming 
loose from the roof were not conspiring to murder the passerby and their 
conspiracy was not somehow thwarted by a divine action. Yet such 
realization, though relatively minor in this example as it relates to a single 
life, may become depressing (in the true and most profound sense of the 
term) when one comes to think of the ultimately purposeless movement of 
life. Thus, static religion, like the ascetic ideal, names the preserving element 
of religion for life, which also implies that religion is fundamentally 
connected to the whole of nature and not something which exists outside of 
it. But, as we have seen, all of the terms that populate Bergson’s integral 
metaphysics are attempts to capture movements with a concept while trying 
to keep as part of that concept that those movements exceed those concepts. 
Let us stay with this thought for a moment before turning to explicate 
certain elements of the Two Sources of Morality and Religion. When I write 
about suffering it is not suffering itself, yet the experience of theorizing 
suffering is in fact part of the movement of suffering. The attempt to 
conceptualize it enters into the time of suffering and in conceptualizing that 
suffering through this method it does not construct a theodicy. For a 
theodicy requires that there be something outside of that movement that 
may justify the suffering. Such a judicious distance is not possible within the 
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practice of an integral metaphysics as Bergson describes it. The thinker is 
imbricated within the thought in movement, taking great effort—even 
painful effort—to collapse the distance between thinker and thought, 
between subject and object, and other standard metaphysical dualities. 
Instead she moves between them, is caught between them, builds borrowing 
from one tendency before moving to the next. She may, by simple chance 
and without hope of escape, live within the world, yet she does not gaze 
upon the blood soaked slaughter-bench and think of the distance. She does 
not conceptualize away the violence, the suffering, or the evil, however 
relative such a concept must be within an integral metaphysics. The 
challenge that is often raised, especially from the perspective of modern 
Jewish thought, is to ask how it would be possible to denounce evil if there 
is no outside, no transcendence, to experience or nature. To further bear out 
the implications of Bergson’s integral metaphysics under the condition of 
suffering, I will now turn to the distinction between the mechanical and the 
mystical and their imbrication for Bergson. 
The final chapter of Two Sources of Morality and Religion is remarkable 
for its foresight. Written in the aftermath of World War I and before the next 
wave of mass suffering, Bergson turns to the problem of mechanization and 
the way that science had been captured by the demand to create machines. 
Bergson is deft in his analysis. On the one hand, he recognizes the fear 
regarding mechanization and, on the other hand, he recognizes that the 
same process unleashes powerful possibilities for freedom.68 Bergson is clear 
that the demands upon science are precisely that. There is nothing 
intrinsically evil about what machines may unleash, for they too are caught 
within the dichotomous flux of an integral experience. Bergson in this 
chapter takes a position against the anti-democratic forces of “authority, 
hierarchy, and immobility.”69 Such are the forces that may direct those 
actions we may collect under the archaic name “the mechanical.” Such 
direction is what we see increasingly within our own control society, despite 
some desperate attempts to valorize the libertarian vision of some 
technicians and entrepreneurs in the tech industry.  
Yet, Bergson’s optimism is fundamentally at work in this moment. He 
recognizes the way the mechanical may be called upon to industrialize the 
suffering that once took place slowly and spectacularly on the slaughter-
bench, turning it into a warehouse of death banal in presentation. Yet, he 
also claims that “the mystical summons up the mechanical. […] mechanism 
should mean mysticism.”70 Bergson’s point here is poetic, but ultimately 
simple and in line with certain technophilic positions today in various 
theoretical works. Ultimately there must be something directing the process 
of mechanization towards greater freedom, towards joy. Human beings 
must make the effort to direct and shape matter in order to longer be subject 
to the narrowness of contemporary material conditions. This is clear when 
he writes, “Man will rise above earthly things only if a powerful equipment 
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supplies him with the requisite fulcrum. He must use matter as a support if 
he wants to get away from matter.”71  
While the emphasis on mysticism might call forth certain elements of 
the cyberpunk culture of the 1990s, the emphasis on enlarging the “soul” 
and deriving greater “moral energy” might make some contemporary 
writers bristle. Yet, this emphasis on the mystical is precisely what makes 
Bergson’s work on the mechanical different than so much of other work in 
the field of technology and social theory. For his discussion of the 
mechanical calling up the mystical takes place right before a discussion of 
imperialism where he makes the claim that “if we keep to true mysticism, 
we shall judge it incompatible with imperialism.”72 Imperialism is always 
about the exercise of sovereignty over others.73 Such an exercise of 
sovereignty always takes place within its own kind of fabulation, like 
“securing a future for the nation” as if these were actual things. But by 
subjecting the mechanical to a moral energy driven by mysticism we move 
away from such teleologically constrained fabulations to those narratives 
that are “without a why” (as the mystical theologian Meister Eckhart 
expresses it). Moving towards an end is a kind of immobility, since the 
experience of the movement is constrained and experiencing the movement 
as movement is foreclosed. The true mystic stands in complete distinction to 
such a teleological fabulation. Bergson says, “True mystics simply open their 
souls to the oncoming wave.”74 There is no telos for the mystic in this 
opening or, to state it slightly differently, there is no narrative for the 
mystic.75 Joy is simply experienced as joy. 
By now I hope that the argument has been convincing that Bergson’s 
integral metaphysics not only is not theodical in shape and moreover that it 
is anti-theodical. There is a rejection of moral panic in Bergson’s writings 
regarding elements of social life as inherently evil. Yet, there is also a sense 
that there is indeed real suffering written into the fabric of that social life. 
The question then that perhaps may still remain is how an integral 
metaphysics may recognize such suffering in the midst of the durée. Such a 
question remains open at the close of this essay. Bergson provides for us a 
powerful philosophy of how to deal with the integrality of nature without 
recourse to transcendence in order to escape theodicy. Regarding the 
recognition of evil within such a philosophy it may come down to the fact 
that evil will only be recognized in the stopping of movement or arresting of 
durée, in the way that narratives of progress are imposed upon the real 
movement of life. What does it mean to recognize evil except to exit from 
suffering and impose upon the lived experience of suffering a narrative of 
evil? The parent who loses their child may reflect upon the experience of 
that child’s death and name it as evil, but only by exiting durée. In the midst 
of suffering there is no recognition, but only the cry. In the same way that 
the mystic opens up to joy, in the experience of suffering one simply opens 
to the unnameable loss. The demand to recognize evil arises only if you 
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assume it is possible to speak from a position outside of it, as if there was a 
position outside of the whole of experience, as if there was a world to live in 
that had not been built through the suffering of slaves. If we were forced to 
respond to the question, “how can one recognize evil” the response from 
within Bergsonism might be that one must undergo evil and, in the midst of 
that dichotomy, find cracks in its imposition of authority, hierarchy, and 
immobility. Within those cracks a body may survive pending joy or even 
simply live as joy without concern for the world. Such a darkened counsel 
can be the only response when one dispenses with symbols and simply 
makes the painful effort to attend to that which matters most. 
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22 See Anthony Paul Smith, Laruelle: A Stranger Thought (Cambridge: Polity, 2016), Chapter 5. 
23 Adorno, Lectures on Negative Dialectics, 104. 
24 Bergson, The Two Sources, 260. 
25 One of the most insightful readings of Bergson traces the movement between two senses or two 
meanings of life in Bergson. See Frédéric Worms, Bergson ou les deux sens de la vie (Paris: PUF, 
2004). This study by Worms has been invaluable for my own attempts to understand the 
seemingly contradictory statements about nature in Bergson’s work. 
26 Bergson, The Two Sources, 58. 
27 Ibid., 260. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 261. 
30 Radical evil is of course a term in Kant's philosophy of religion. However, my use of the term owes 
more to the tradition of Job given voice by Martin Beck Matuštík in his Radical Evil and the 
Scarcity of Hope: Postsecular Meditations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008). There 
he writes, "Yet what I call 'radical evil' in this book appears at first, contra Kant, in a religious 
intensity bursting through the bounds of mere reason. [...] A cruel agent can be punished, just 
as a morally wicked one can repent. But no amount of repentance and even accepted and 
completed punishments can in and of itself restore shattered bonds." (15) In other words, radical 
evil refers to an experience of harm or harming that exceeds the logic of restoration. For 
Matuštík this constitutes a "negatively saturated phenomenon" à la Jean-Luc Marion. (16) 
31 See Adorno, Lectures of Negative Dialectics, 6-7. 
32 See Jankélévitch, 5-6. Jankélévitch is here making a case against thinking of Bergson’s philosophy 
as an “ism,” in this case “intuitionism.” Claiming instead that duration is the “living centre” of 
his philosophy. 
33 Henri Bergson, Key Writings, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson and John Ó Maoilearca, trans. Mellissa 
McMahon (London and New York: Continuum, 2002), 362-363.  
34 Henri Gouhier, Bergson et le Christ des évangiles (Paris: Le Signe, 1961), 30. As many will already 
know, spiritualism in French philosophy does not have the same connotations as it does in 
English. It shares more in common with non-materialist philosophy of mind than it does with 
early 20th century esoteric societies. Gouhier tells us that Bergson pursued the dream of a 
philosophy of spirit which would constitute the interior of a philosophy of nature. In this way 
Bergson is the fulfillment of the first of two traditions of spiritualism in French philosophy. The 
first tradition, of Ravaisson and Lachelier, held that spirituality coincides with the interiority of 
the vital, while the second, inaugurated by Biran and based in anthropology, is defined as 
subjectivity radically differentiated from vitality (24). 
35 Gouhier, 19. All translations from Gouhier are my own. As with the German Geist the French 
ésprit may refer to both “mind” or “spirit.” Gouhier at times clearly means “mind” in the sense 
of the object studied in psychology and other times to the more expansive concept “spirit.” In 
the selections quoted here I have tried to determine when each choice is appropriate. 
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36 Gouhier tells us that it amused Bergson to have his work considered under the title of psychology. 
“From the outset his work was not at all turned in that direction, but rather towards the 
philosophy of the sciences of nature” (18). 
37 Gouhier, 20. 
38 Adorno, Lectures on Negative Dialectics, 85. 
39 Gouhier, 31. 
40 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, trans. F. L. 
Pogson (London: George Allen & Company, Ltd, 1913), 83-84. 
41 Ibid., 7 
42 Ibid., 20. 
43 Ibid., 30. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 75-6. 
47 Ibid., 79. 
48 Ibid., 83. 
49 See Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. High Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone 
Books, 1988), 19. 
50 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 56. 
51 See John Ó Maoilearca, Bergson and Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 55-
56. 
52 Ó Maoilearca, 55. 
53 “Homogenous space and homogeneous time are then neither properties of things nor essential 
conditions of our faculty of knowledge: they express, in an abstract form, the double work of 
solidification and of division which we effect on the moving continuity of the real in order to 
obtain there a fulcrum for our action, in order to fix within it starting points for our operation, 
in short, to introduce into it real changes. They are the diagrammatic design of our eventual 
action upon matter.” Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. 
Scott Palmer (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 211. 
54 See Chapter 1 of Matter and Memory where Bergson shows that perception must be taken as a 
whole. 
55 “That there are, in a sense, multiple objects, that one man is distinct from another man, tree 
from tree, stone from stone, is an indisputable fact; for each of these beings, each of these 
things, has characteristic properties and obeys a determined law of evolution. But the 
separation between a thing and its environment cannot be absolutely definite and clear-cut; 
there is a passage by insensible gradations from the one to the other: the close solidarity which 
binds all the objects of the material universe, the perpetuality of their reciprocal actions and 
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reactions, is sufficient to prove that they have not the precise limits which we attribute to 
them.” Bergson, Matter and Memory, 209. 
56 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 221. See also Ó Maoilearca, 144-146 on the nature of qualitative 
multiplicity. 
57 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2005), 
4. 
58 Deleuze makes the somewhat humorous point that one can always stir the water with a spoon to 
help the sugar dissolve. See Deleuze, Cinema, 9. 
59 Bergson, Creative Evolution, 8. 
60 Adorno, Metaphysics, 110. 
61 See Sylvia Wynter, “1492: A New World View” in Race, Discourse, and the Origin of the Americas: 
A New World View, eds. Vera Lawerence Hyatt and Rex Nettleford (Washington: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 1995) and Sylvia Wynter, “Unsettling the Coloniality of 
Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation” in CR: 
The New Centennial Review 3.3 (Fall 2003): 257-337. 
62 See Edward E. Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American 
Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 2014).  
63 Adorno, Metaphysics, 110. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Bergson, The Two Sources, 205. 
66 Ibid., 125. 
67 Ibid., 119. Compare this analysis with that of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic 
of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2002) where they trace the ways in which the dream of Enlightenment self-
mastery has slipped into the worst sort of barbarisms and and that “enlightenment’s mythic 
terror springs forth from a horror of myth” (22). Moreover they claim that “enlightenment itself, 
having mastered itself and assumed its own power, could break through the limits of 
enlightenment” (172). 
68 Bergson should perhaps be credited—as far as these things go—for his nascent alliance with 
feminist concerns regarding reproductive rights. See Bergson, The Two Sources, 302-03 and 
Leonard Lawlor, The Challenge of Bergsonism: Phenomenology, Ontology, Ethics (New York: 
Continuum, 2003), 91-97. For Bergson something like birth control would free women from 
certain "natural inequalities" that is forced upon women via motherhood. While these comments 
are found in a discussion of the need, in his view, to control human population growth, he 
thankfully does not appear to have any of the sympathy for eugenics that has marred the legacy 
of early birth control advocates like Margaret Sanger. His scant comments on peoples outside of 
Europe do not suggest Bergson favored any kind of essentialist "racial difference" that might be 
controlled for genetically. 
69 Bergson, The Two Sources, 282. 
70 Ibid., 310. 
71 Ibid., 309. 
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72 Ibid., 311. 
73 Ibid. Arguably in Bergson’s discussion of exercising sovereignty over things rather than persons, he 
falls into the classic position of an Enlightenment philosopher like those of whom Adorno is 
critical. 
74 Ibid., 99. 
75 On this point it is worth challenging Bergson’s historical understanding of Christianity since the 
Christian mystics he references since so much of their thought is carried in narratives of their 
lives and, in general, his reading of Christianity is far less nuanced and dynamic than it ought to 
be. 
